It is the field of the problematic that defines and structures the invisible as the defined excluded, excluded from the field of visibility and defined as excluded by the existence and peculiar structure of the field of the problematic; as what forbids and represses the reflection of the field on its object, i.e., the necessary and immanent inter-relationship of the problematic and one of its objects.
[…] These new objects and problems are necessarily invisible in the field of the existing theory, because they are forbidden by it—they are objects and problems necessarily without any necessary relations with the field of the visible as defined by the problematic. They are invisible because they are rejected in principle, repressed from the field of the visible: and that is why their fleeting presence in the field when it does occur (in very peculiar and symptomatic circumstances) goes unperceived, and becomes literally an undivulgeable absence—since the whole function of the field is not to see them, to forbid any sighting of them. Here, again, the invisible is no more a function of a subject’s sighting than is the visible: the invisible is the theoretical problematic’s non-vision of its non-objects, the invisible is the darkness, the blinded eye of the theoretical problematic’s self-reflection when it scans its non-objects, its non-problems without seeing them, in order not to look at them.
